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and state."8 To hold otherwise would effectively destroy the concept of
representative church government in the United States."9
THOMAS B. ANDERSON
Social Welfare-The "Man in the House" Returns to Stay
Under the type of state welfare regulation popularly known as the
"substitute father" rule, children otherwise eligible for benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children' program are denied assistance
if their natural parent maintains a continuing sexual relationship with
someone of the opposite sex. This person is deemed to be a non-absent
parent within the meaning of the Social Security Act, thus rendering
the family ineligible for AFDC payments. Whether this person is legally
obligated to support the children is irrelevant; whether he does in fact
contribute to their support is also irrelevant; eligibility under such a
rule is determined solely by the relationship between the parent (usually
the mother of the children) and the "substitute" (usually an unrelated
male).
In King v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court unanimously held Alabama's
"substitute father" rule invalid as inconsistent with Title IV of the So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). Declining to reach the
constitutional issue presented, the Court found the Alabama provision
to be violative of the "Flemming Ruling"' and held that it defined
"sCf. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cath., 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952); Goodson v.
Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 103 (S.D. Ala. 1966).
" Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (W.D. Mo. 1913).
1 Aid to Families with Dependent Children [hereinafter cited as AFDC] is
one of the major components of the public assistance program established by the
Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 601-09 (1964). The program grants
aid to dependent, needy children who have been "deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent," and who live with any of certain enumerated rela-
tives. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1) (1964). For a thorough discussion of AFDC and its
predecessors, see W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965).
88 S. Ct. 2128 (1968).
'42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964). The ruling, given statutory approval in 1961
in response to a directive issued by the then Secretary of the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare, Arthur Flemming, provides that
A State plan for aid to dependent children may not impose an eligibility
condition that would deny assistance with respect to a needy child on the
basis that the home conditions in which the child lives are unsuitable, while
the child continues to reside in the home. Assistance will therefore be
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"parent" in a broader sense than that intended by the Social Security
Act.4 Although aid can be granted under the Act only if a "parent" is
continually absent from the home, Congress intended the word "parent"
to designate one owing a duty of support to the child imposed by state
law. A state's definition of the word should therefore be no broader;
one who owed no state-imposed duty of support was not a "parent,"
his association with the mother was not parental presence, and it did
not justify severance of AFDC funds. An unrelated male adult in Ala-
bama owed no such legal duty, and therefore the Court found the regula-
tion invalid.
Some nineteen states5 and the District of Columbia have such regula-
tions and have been directly affected by the ruling.0 This note will
attempt to deal with the probable impact of the court's holding upon
the welfare systems in these states and will consider, as an example,
North Carolina's experience with the substitute father rule and the effect
of the decision on this state.
There is a marked scarcity of case law on "man-in-the-house" rules,
as there is on welfare law in general.' Such regulations have generally
continued during the time efforts are being made either to improve the
home conditions or to make arrangements for the child elsewhere.
Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Dep't of Health,
Educ., and Welfare, State Letter No. 452 (Jan. 17, 1961).
'The Alabama regulation called for the termination of aid if the mother
cohabited with the "substitute father," either inside the home or elsewhere; the
mother then bore the burden of proving that the relationship had been dis-
continued before assistance could be resumed. The substitute's relationship with
the children themselves was immaterial. ALABAMIA STATE DEP'T OF PENSIONS AND
SECURITY, MANUAL FOR ADMIlNISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Part I, Ch.
II, § VI(V) (A) (1964). The plaintiff in King found her AFDC payments
terminated because of alleged-and undisputed-weekend visits by one Willie
Williams. Mr. Williams lived 15 miles away with his wife and eight of his
nine children; he was not the father of any of Mrs. Smith's children and was
both unwilling and unable to provide for their support, since he could hardly
support his own family. This determination by the local welfare board left Mrs.
Smith in the position of having to support her family on her cook's salary of 16
dollars a week. 88 S. Ct. at 2131.
'Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 88 S. Ct. at 2143.
'The decision "beneficially affect[ed] more than 21,000 in Alabama and per-
haps as many as 400,000 throughout the country ... " N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,
1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
'This is understandable in that most potential plaintiffs have neither the
means of securing legal aid, nor knowledge of their rights, and are usually
placated with administrative review of their case-if even this right is exercised
by them. For example, appeals in one North Carolina County were estimated at no
more than two per month. Interview with Gerald Allen, University of North Car-
olina School of Social Work, in Chapel Hill, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968. The right to ad-
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withstood attack in the state courts in the few instances in which they
have been challenged.' Recently, however, at least one state has liberal-
ized its rule by administrative review,' and other similar regulations are
being challenged in the federal courts.'0 In other jurisdictions, recent
administrative decisions have reversed denials of AFDC benefits to chil-
dren on the grounds that their mother was convicted of welfare fraud,"
and have required a high standard of proof as to the existence of a
"man-in-the-house" before curtailing AFDC payments.'" The decision
in King" marked the first time such a regulation has been challenged
successfully in the federal courts, and perhaps in any appellate court.
Essentially, the Supreme Court held that denial of AFDC payments
to otherwise eligible children must not leave a vacuum in the support
provided the child-there must be either a legally responsible adult as
defined under a state's own support laws, or "other adequate care and
assistance" as required by the statutory implementation of the Flemming
Ruling.14 The effect of the opinion is to prohibit denial of the funds
solely on the basis of the mother's relationship with a man not legally
obligated to support her children. The significance of the decision is not
so sweeping as it might appear, however. The Court noted that actual
contributions from a "man-in-the-house" could be taken into considera-
ministrative appeals, however, is carefully pointed out in most generally distributed
welfare literature. See, e.g., N.C. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PUBLIC ASSISTANcE
FOR NEEDY PEOPLE IN NORTi CAROLINA, INFOR. BOOKLET No. 36 (1968).
'See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1961); People v. Ford, 236 Cal. App. 2d 438, 46 Cal. Rptr. 144 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 100 (1966); People v. Rozell, 212 Cal.
App. 2d 875, 28 Cal. Rptr. 478 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963). All of these decisions
affirmed convictions of "grand theft" of welfare benefits by reason of nondis-
closure of an alleged "man-in-the-house." See also County of Kern v. Coley, 229
Cal. App. 2d 172, 40 Cal. Rptr. 53 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1964), affirming a judg-
ment for the plaintiff county in a suit to recover alleged overpayments of ANC
(California's AFDC) funds because of the unreported income of an unrelated
male living in the house.
' Matter of D, Hearing before N.Y. State Dep't of Social Welfare (1966),
noted in 5 WELFARE L. BULL. 3 (1966).
10 McPherson v. Montgomery, Civ. No. 46759 (N.D. Cal., filed March 25,
1967), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (1967); Robinson v. Board of Comm'rs.,
No. 3399-66 (D.D.C., filed Dec., 1966), noted in 7 WELFARE L. BULL. 3 (1967).
"Matter of J., Case No. U.C.-1858, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (May 25,
1967); Matter of W., Case No. U.C.-808, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (May
2, 1967); noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 10 (1967).
1" Matter of C., Case No. C-29-208-0, D.C. Dep't of Public Welfare (April
20, 1967) ("reasonable and substantial evidence"); Matter of D., Case No. VC-
1210, N.J. Dep't of Inst. & Agencies (April 20, 1967) ("beyond a reasonable
doubt"), noted in 9 WELFARE L. BULL. 9 (1967).
1 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
1442 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
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tion in computing need.' 5 Also, states apparently may still terminate
AFDC payments under such a rule, provided the man is one whom the
state has defined as owing a legal duty of support to the child. In
any case, in fact, where an alternative provision is made for the child's
support, King will have little effect. The "substitute father" rule is over-
turned only in those instances where AFDC funds are completely termi-
nated and the children left without other adequate care.
It is possible that states may attempt to amend their laws to impose
duties of support on stepfathers and common-law husbands. If only
King were controlling, these devices might be successful in decreasing the
AFDC caseload. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), however, has responded to the Court's decision by amending
its regulations to provide that the determination of whether a child has
been deprived of parental support or care "will be made only in relation
to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to a child's step-
parent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive
parent and is legally obligated to support the child under state law."16
In another section, the directive specifically excludes reliance by a state
on a "substitute parent" or "man-in-the-house" as a basis for a finding
of ineligibility or for assuming availability of income.
17
Thus, HEW has apparently substituted its own authority for that
of the state in defining "parent," for the Court's decision alone probably
left states free under the Social Security Act to define "parent" as long
as their definition was limited to those owing a duty of support imposed
by state law. Now HEW has further limited the policy by eliminating,
for instance, common-law stepfathers, regardless of the state's support
laws. In addition, the new regulation prohibits a state from assuming
income from a non-parent to be available in the computation of the
family's resources. Rather, the state must assume the burden of proving
"actual contributions.""
" 88 S. Ct. at 2134. In addition, states are free, under the Social Security Act,
to set their own standards of need and the amount of support to be given,
and may take into consideration in determining need any resources a family
might have. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1964). Any contributions counted, however,
must be "actual" and on a regular basis. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDuC. AND WELFARE,
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AssIsTANCE ADMINISTRATION, IV, § 3131. In fact, states
have been asked since the ruling to encourage contributions from an unrelated
adult living in the home. Letter from Mary E. Switzer, Administrator, Social
and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, to State Administrators, August 8, 1968.
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The principal difficulty with HEW's extension of the Ifing holding
is the absence of any real enforcement power, short of complete termina-
tion of federal matching funds-hardly a desirable alternative."0 To the
extent that the new regulation exceeds the Court's decision, a more useful
power of enforcement is advisable.20 In any case, there is little likeli-
hood that dilatory or evasive measures will be undertaken by the states
for the time being,'I Congress recently enacted legislation, effective July
1, 1969, "freezing" the amount of federal matching funds that will be
available to the states for their AFDC programs, using as a base period
the first quarter of 1968.22 Ordinarily, then, the proportion of AFDC
children eligible for these grants would be set, and there would be no
incentive on the part of the states to absorb more children into their
caseloads, since the base period has passed. Congress, however, provided
an exception in the Act for children who began to receive aid after
March, 1968, as a result of the judicial decision invalidating a substitute
parent rule or residence test.23 Thus the children readmitted as a result
of King will be added to the total during the base period in order
to determine the proportion to be granted federal matching aid.
In light of the impending "freeze," there is every incentive for a state
to comply fully and immediately with the Court's decree, so as to make
eligible for federal matching grants the greatest possible number of chil-
dren during the base period.4
1 Though it is not an unprecedented one. Cf. Gardner v. Alabama, 385 F.2d
804 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 773 (1968) (order terminating
federal funds for noncompliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 upheld).
2 Federalizing the whole AFDC program has been suggested by one noted
author. BELL, snpra note 1, at 186. Bell points out that although the federal
taxpayer in 1960 paid 58.4 per cent of the cost of AFDC, in Southern states
the federal government paid such proportions of the cost as 79.8 per cent in
Alabama, 80.2 per cent in Arkansas, and 77.8 per cent in North Carolina. Id. at
219 n.36.
"Although North Carolina, subsequent to the lower court decision in King,
adopted a welfare regulation conditioning receipt of AFDC upon proof that
instruction in birth control methods had been received by the applicant (or that
she was sterile), the regulation has since been repealed, upon order from HEW.
Resolution of the State Board of Public Welfare of North Carolina, Sept. 25,
1968.
"2Tax Adjustment Act of 1968, H.R. 15414, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 114 CoN.
REc. H4685 (1968).
2 Id. North Carolina's birth-control restriction mentioned above did not come
within this categorical exception; there was, therefore, no incentive for the state
to refrain from applying it.
"4 After July 1, 1969, however, restrictive measures by some states designed
to weed out certain classes of recipients from the welfare rolls may occur.
Administrative review of such measures will be needed to insure that the newly-
won rights of AFDC mothers and children are not jeopardized by state-imposed
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North Carolina, for example, recently deleted its version of the "sub-
stitute father" rule25 in response to an advisory letter from HEW ;26 it
is reasonably safe to assume that the decision will have a similar effect
in other states with such rules. In order to understand the significance
of King in states other than Alabama, it is helpful to examine briefly
the North Carolina rule and its background. The original North Caro-
lina rule was adopted in 1955 and underwent at least two revisions, the
latest of which (May 1, 1968) probably represented an attempt to ac-
comodate the lower court decision in King and its anticipated affirmation
by the Supreme Court.
As revised in 1959, the rule provided simply that a county board of
public welfare could terminate aid to a woman with an illegitimate child
if it found that a "common law relationship" existed between the woman
and a man to whom she was not married. The manual then enumerated
several "factors" for determining the existence of such a relationship.2"
This rule discriminated against illegitimate children (or children with
illegitimate siblings); in addition, it obviously came within the type of
rule proscribed by King and the HEW directive, in that the sole basis
for determining eligibility was the "common law" relationship between
the woman and her paramour, without regard to the support and needs
of the child.
In 1965, the State Board of Public Welfare received a new chair-
man,"° who personally revised the regulation, 0 effective May 1, 1968:
No child who is living with one of his or her parents, such parent
not being physically or -mentally incapacitated, shall be deemed de-
restrictions. It is perhaps regrettable that HEW does not have more power to
insure these rights by administrative sanctions than by recourse to piecemeal
litigation in the federal courts.
"DIVISION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, N.C. STATE BD. OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 440 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC Assis-
TANCE MANUAL].
"0 Resolution of the State Board of Public Welfare of North Carolina, Sept. 25,
1968.
' PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 440 (1959).
"These included frequent association with one another, "evidence of preg-
nancy, evidence that the man provides food or makes regular contributions toward
support of the mother and children, or that he shows an interest in the mother
and children that would be expected of a husband and father." Id.
" Governor Moore appointed Robert C. Howison, Jr., a Raleigh attorney, to
succeed Howard E. Manning as Chairman, effective April 1, 1965. N.C. STATE
BD. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, BIENNIAL REPORT, JULY 1, 1964-JUNE 30, 1966, 15
(1966).
" Interview with Robert H. Ward, Assistant Commissioner, N.C. Dep't of
Public Welfare, in Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968.
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prived of parental support or care, for the purpose of determining
eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, if some person
of the opposite sex from such parent is acting in loco parentis to the
child. A person shall be deemed acting in loco parentis to the child
if such person acts as a parent to the child and treats the child as
his own.
31
Several significant changes are to be noted: the rule referred to "no
child," reflecting the intent of the Board not to restrict the rule to mothers
of illegitimates ;32 in addition, the language was made mandatory instead
of being in the discretion of the local welfare boards; finally, "in loco
parentis" terminology was substituted for the "common law" relation-
ship previously required. Apparently this subtle modification was de-
signed to circumvent semantically the effect of the lower court ruling in
King, that decision having censured restrictions on eligibility based on the
mother's relationship with a man, but having said nothing explicit about
the child's relationship with his "substitute parent." The distinction,
however, was insignificant; for, as stated later by the Supreme Court,
"the actual financial situation of the family [was] irrelevant in determin-
ing the existence of a substitute father."83 The criteria of King had
not been met: there was still no state-imposed duty of support, no "other
adequate care and assistance" provided for the child. The rule also fell
squarely within HEW's prohibition of eligibility conditions based on
persons other than "parents," as HEW defined the term. The regulation
could not survive.
The King decision is a salutary one, for "substitute parent"-type
rules have little to recommend them. A variety of persons familiar with
the problems of social welfare have attacked them;3 the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders has recommended their total aboli-
tion;35 and at least some state welfare administrators, trained in social
" PUBLIC AssIsTANcE MANUAL § 440 (1968).
"Interview with Clifton M. Craig, Commissioner, N.C. Dep't of Public Wel-
fare, in Raleigh, N.C., Sept. 6, 1968. Bell notes a similar instance in Mississippi
where, after federal attorneys pointed out the discrimination of such a rule, it
was changed to exclude all children. BELL, supra note 1, at 98.
"88 S. Ct. at 2135.
See People v. Shirley, 55 Cal. 2d 521, 360 P.2d 33, 11 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1961)
(Peters, J., dissenting). See generally BELL, supra note 1; Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
tenBroek, The Impact of Welfare Law upon Family Law, 42 CALIF. L. REV.
458 (1954); Wickenden, Poverty, Civil Liberties, and Civil Rights: A Sym-
posium, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 328, 333 (1966); Symposium, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 319
(1966).
"5 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 464
(1968).
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work, have reservations as to their merits.3 6
Such restrictions permit discrimination by biased local officials; they
hold the AFDC mother to an uncommonly strict code of personal con-
duct ;37 they may be self-defeating in purpose-for if all but the most
casual contact with a man is suspect, how is an AFDC mother ever to
gain a husband? The "substitute parent" rule is arguably incorrect in its
basic assumptions-the presence of a "man-in-the-house," far from ren-
dering a home "unsuitable," may be beneficial to the psychological growth
of the children ;'8 he may develop a relationship with them warmer than
that of many "natural" parents, particularly the type whose support is
sought to be enforced by abandonment proceedings. Further, the back-
bone of such laws-the "worthy poor" concept, which confined poor
relief to the "morally fit" indigent-is scarcely consistent with modem
notions of social welfare.39
King v. Smith very likely signifies a new role for the Supreme Court
in protecting the rights of welfare recipients, though it is of but small
significance compared with the work yet to be done. The entire, complex
system of social welfare needs to be reformed--"legalized"-by insuring
recipients of their basic rights in a modern welfare state40 and by guaran-
teeing them the procedural safeguards needed to assert those rights.
Ideally, the reform should come from within, by administrative decision
coupled with realistic welfare legislation and funding by Congress and
the states. It is more likely, however, that in the interim it will fall to
the courts to insure these rights-even though, as in King, their de-
cisions may only implement already-existing administrative regulations.
" Interview with Clifton M. Craig, supra note 29; interview with Robert H.
Ward, supra note 27.
"' See BELL, supra note 1; Commissioner King, defendant in the King case,
has another view: "[T]he mother has a choice in this situation to give up her
pleasures or act like a woman ought to act and continue to receive aid. .. .
King v. Smith, 88 S. Ct. 2128, Append. Vol. I, 103 (1968).
" Brief for appellants at 32, King v. Smith, 88 S. Ct. 2128 (1968).
" For an extended discussion of the origins of poor relief and the evolution
of the "worthy poor" concept, see BELL, supra note 1. There is another reason,
perhaps more compelling to welfare administrators, for rejecting any "suitable
home" provision: a rule allowing very much local discretion may well run afoul
of the federal requirement that the state plan be uniformly administered by a
single state agency whose rules, regulations, and standards are mandatory on
local administrative authorities. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1), (3) (1964).
"' While we would question any tendency to accept welfare dependency as
a permanent condition of any group, it is both humane and necessary for
the nation to take thought now for the 15 per cent of its citizens who
would be reached by welfare reform.
The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 4, 1968, at 16, col. 1.
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Perhaps this reformation will come with an opinion as significant in
the area of poverty law as Brown v. Board of Education41 was in civil
rights. King v. Smith is far from being that case. What is called for is
something on the order of a decision insuring, as a right, a minimum
standard of material comfort.
42
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.
Torts-Recent Extensions in Builder-Vendor's Liability for Defects
For the buyer of a home who suffers injury or loss due to defective
construction,1 the traditional obstacle in a suit against the builder-vendor
has been the ancient rule of caveat emptor,2 that unless the vendee has
a claim of fraud or of breach of expressed warranty, he takes the risk
himself of quality and condition.2 Today that rule is subject to broad
and growing exceptions, 4 which threaten to replace it with implied war-
ranty and a general duty of due care.
Some of these expanding areas are touched upon by a recent South
Carolina case. In Rogers v. Scyphers,5 'the wife of the vendee of a new
house sued the subdeveloper' for negligent construction and for negligent
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Or one implementing Professor Reich's "theory of entitlement" to welfare
benefits; Professor Reich would elevate the receipt of public assistance, long
regarded as a privilege, to the status of a legal right. Reich, supra note 34, at
1252.
' Construction is described as "defective" if it is faulty, or lacking something
essential to its completeness, or not reasonably safe for its anticipated use. Gallo-
way v. City of Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 92, 184 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1944) ; Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, 44 NJ. 70, 92, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ; BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 506 (4th ed. 1951).
'See, e.g., Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66 (1925), overruled
by Belote v. Memphis Dev. Co. 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441 (1961). See
generally 55 Amf. JtnR. Vendor and Purchaser § 57 (1946); 7 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW oF CONTRAcTS § 926A (3d ed. 1963).
'See, e.g., State ex. rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 634, 179 S.W.2d
19, 20 (1944), overrded by Morrow v. Caloric Appl. Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo.
1963). See Note, Right of Purchaser in Sale of Defective House, 4 WEST. REs.
L. REv. 357 (1953) for a survey of vendee's limitations fifteen years ago.
'See notes 8, 24, 25, 41 & 43 infra. See generally Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Bearman].
- S.C. -, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
'Mrs. Rogers sued the Industrial Life Insurance Company, which actually
built the house, and Scyphers, who was president and principal stockholder in
the company and was supervisor of the construction. The company conveyed the
house to Scyphers, who sold it to Rogers. The court does not distinguish one
defendant from the other. Id.
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